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Lawful to the World: Protecting the
Integrity of the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine
JASON LILJESTROM*

INTRODUCTION

In the 1984 case of Nix v. Williams, the Supreme Court officially
adopted the inevitable discovery doctrine as an exception to its judicially
created exclusionary rule.' Under the inevitable discovery doctrine,
evidence that would normally be excluded will not be suppressed if the
prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that it
would have inevitably been discovered by lawful means.' In essence, the
prosecution relies upon a hypothetical independent source to admit
evidence that was actually obtained in violation of the defendant's
constitutional rights.
The starting point in inevitable discovery cases is police misconduct,
as the evidence was actually obtained in violation of the defendant's
personal constitutional rights. Yet, if the prosecution can point to
alternative, lawful means that would have uncovered the evidence, then a
court will excuse the violation and allow the evidence to be admitted. In
the typical inevitable discovery case, there is only one defendant at issue,
and the scope and interpretation of the lawful means requirement is
clear. For example, in Nix, police officers discovered the location of a
murder victim's body as a result of an illegal line of questioning of the
defendant (at the time a suspect in custody). 3 At the same time that the
defendant's rights were being violated, a search party of over two
hundred community volunteers was close to finding the body.4 At trial,
the prosecution relied on this search party to prove that the body would

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law,

2007.

My sincere

thanks to Professor John Diamond for his guidance and good humor throughout the composition of
this Note, to the members of the Hastings Law Journal for their passion for editing, and most
importantly, to my mother, my father, and my grandparents for their continued love and support.
Enjoy.
i. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
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have been inevitably discovered even if police officers had never illegally
questioned the defendant.' Thus, in Nix, it was clear that the means
relied on in the prosecution's hypothetical were in fact "lawful."
Nonetheless, Nix does not answer the question of how the lawful means
requirement should be interpreted when there is more than one
defendant. For instance, police may illegally search one party and then
seek to use that evidence to argue that the discovery of evidence against
the relevant defendant was inevitable.
At first blush, it seems clear that relying on an illegal search of a
third party would run afoul of the requirement that the evidence be
obtained by lawful means. Nevertheless, in a separate line of cases, the
Supreme Court has expressly prohibited vicarious exclusionary
challenges. 6 In a vicarious exclusionary challenge, a defendant attempts
to suppress incriminating evidence because it was illegally obtained from
someone else. By prohibiting such a challenge, the Supreme Court has
injected a personal, relational concept into its exclusionary rule
jurisprudence, suggesting that all exclusionary rule cases should be
analyzed through a lens focused only on the relevant defendant before
the court.
The prohibition against vicarious exclusionary challenges creates
ambiguity in the interpretation of the word "lawful" as used in Nix, and
in particular, to whom the lawfulness must apply. Reasonable jurists can
differ as to the resolution of the apparent conflict, as shown by the circuit
split that lies at the heart of this Note. For instance, in United States v.
Scott, the First Circuit allowed the prosecution to rely on evidence taken
in violation of a third party's constitutional rights to invoke the inevitable
discovery doctrine against the relevant defendant By contrast, three
years later in United States v. Johnson, the Seventh Circuit prevented the
prosecution from relying on an illegal search of a third party to show that
the evidence used against the defendant would have been inevitably
discovered.8
In neither case were legal means used. The evidence was actually
obtained in violation of the defendant's rights, and the prosecution relied
on violations of a third party's rights. Yet the divergent conclusions
hinged on the respective court's interpretation of the word "lawful"
when applied to the inevitable discovery doctrine, in light of the Supreme
Court's prohibition on vicarious exclusionary challenges. Essentially, the
First Circuit interpreted the lawful means requirement as merely "lawful

5. Id. at 437.
6. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731-33 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, i33-

38 (1978); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165,
7. 27o F.3d 30, 42-45 (ist Cir. 20o0).
8. 380 F.3 d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2004).

171-76
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in relation to the relevant defendant before the court," while the Seventh
Circuit interpreted the lawful means requirement to mean "lawful to the
world.

'

These cases disclose a divergence in application of a doctrine that is
already rife with criticism and calls for limitations, setting the stage for
the Supreme Court to resolve the debate. This Note focuses on the
lawful means requirement and engages in a comprehensive analysis to
determine the correct interpretation in light of the Supreme Court's
prohibition against vicarious exclusionary challenges. As background, it
lays out the inevitable discovery doctrine, and explains its foundation as
an exception to the exclusionary rule. The Note will then clarify the
unique sets of facts that gave rise to the circuit split and explain the
reasoning behind the divergent conclusions.
The analysis is based on a hypothetical factual scenario that mirrors
the novel set of circumstances confronted by the First Circuit in Scott and
the Seventh Circuit in Johnson. Applying the inevitable discovery
doctrine to the hypothetical, this Note asserts that the Seventh Circuit's
broad interpretation of the lawful means requirement must be the
correct one from the standpoint of promoting justice. This Note explains
why Judge Posner's invocation of tort law is an excellent way to diffuse
the seemingly irreconcilable conflict between a broad interpretation of
the lawful means requirement and the prohibition against vicarious
exclusionary challenges.' Yet it also recognizes logical inconsistencies in
Judge Posner's analogy of the inevitable discovery doctrine to the tort
doctrine of concurrent causation."
When such a prominent legal scholar weighs in on an issue that
could have tremendous importance in the criminal procedure realm and
law enforcement, it is necessary to closely inspect his decision. As this
Note demonstrates, the better analogy is the differing conceptions of the
duty element of negligence actions, revealed in the seminal tort case of
Palsgrafv. Long Island Railroad Co. "
Ultimately, the Palsgrafopinion offers an instructive framework that
helps reconcile the conflict between the prohibition on vicarious
exclusionary challenges and interpreting the lawful means requirement
as lawful to the world. The analogy sets forth well-established legal
principles that provide an avenue to reach the only conclusion that
protects the integrity of the inevitable discovery doctrine.
9. The respective interpretations are in quotation marks for ease of understanding to the reader.
These phrases were not used by the First and Seventh Circuits in their opinions.
Io. Some legal scholars have already employed the strategy of solving problems in the criminal
procedure realm with principles of tort law. See, e.g., Jason M. Solomon, Causing ConstitutionalHarm:
How Tort Law Can Help Determine Harmless Errorin CriminalTrials, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 1053 (2005).
ii. See Johnson,380 F.3d at ioi6.
12. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. AN EXCEPTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

The inevitable discovery doctrine is an exception to the judicially
created exclusionary rule, which bars the court from admitting evidence
that was obtained as a result of police misconduct. Accordingly, it is
necessary to briefly explain the operation of the exclusionary rule in
order to understand the inevitable discovery exception.
The exclusionary rule entered the realm of criminal procedure in
1914 with the seminal case of Weeks v. United States, where the Supreme
Court held that evidence obtained by an unreasonable search or seizure
is inadmissible and cannot be introduced at a subsequent trial. 3 Nearly
fifty years later, the Court extended the reach of the exclusionary rule by
means of the Fourteenth Amendment, making it applicable to statebased prosecutions.' 4 In essence, the judicially created doctrine dictates
that "evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot
be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal search
and seizure."' 5 In addition, the doctrine applies to Fifth and Sixth
Amendment violations." Furthermore, the exclusionary rule prohibits
admission not only of the evidence directly obtained from police
misconduct, but also evidence derived from the primary illegality,
cleverly dubbed "fruit of the poisonous tree.""
Although several policy rationales have been asserted for the
exclusionary rule in its near-century of existence, deterrence of future
police misconduct has emerged as the primary justification. The Supreme

Court has recognized the tremendous social cost of excluding highly
probative evidence of a crime, but nonetheless maintains it is necessary
to deter police from violations of constitutional protections." In the
words of Justice Powell, "the rule is a judicially created remedy designed
to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent
effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved."' 9 The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to "compel respect
for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by
removing the incentive to disregard it."' "Despite its broad deterrent
13. 232 U.S. 383,398 (1914).
14. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,655 (i961).
15. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (974).
i6. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442 (1984).

I7. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).
18. Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-43.
I9. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348. Despite the word "remedy" in his description, Justice Powell was
careful to point out that the purpose of the exclusionary rule was not to afford a remedy to the victim
of the illegal search. Id. To the contrary, the rule "is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is
to deter .. ." Id. at 347-48 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
20. Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217 (citing Eleuteri v. Richman, I4 A.2d 46,50 (N.J. 1958)).
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purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe
the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all
persons." 2' As the Supreme Court emphasized in United States v.
Calandra, "the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas
where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.""
Accordingly, the Court has carved out several exceptions to the
exclusionary rule for circumstances under which its deterrent purpose is
not furthered.
The first exception, coming just six years after Weeks, and the one
from which the inevitable discovery doctrine was brought to life,23 is the
"independent source" doctrine. In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United
States, Justice Holmes emphasized that facts obtained in violation of a
defendant's constitutional rights do not become "sacred and
inaccessible." 4 Rather, "[i]f knowledge of them is gained from an
independent source they may be proved like any others....,,

"For

example, where an unlawful warrantless search has given the police
knowledge of facts A, B, and C, but fact C has also been learned by other
means, fact C can be admissible at trial because it was derived from an
independent source. ' ,, 6 Over forty years later, Wong Sun v. United States
reaffirmed and expanded Silverthorne,creating a second exception to the
exclusionary rule. 7 There, the Supreme Court reasoned that not "all
evidence is 'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it would not have
come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. ' ,, 8 Rather, the more
important question is "whether, granting establishment of the primary
illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come
at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint." 9 In an investigation
that begins with illicit police conduct, a subsequent act of free will on the
part of the defendant is a good example of something that would
dissipate the taint.3" With the Supreme Court willing to forego the
Calandra,414 U.S. at 348.
22. Id.
23. In Murray v. United States, the Supreme Court characterized the inevitable discovery doctrine
as an "extrapolation" from the independent source doctrine. 487 U.S. 533,539 (1988).
24. 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
25. Id.
26. Troy E. Golden, The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Today: The Demands of the Fourth
Amendment, Nix, and Murray, and the Disagreement Among the Federal Circuits, 13 BYU J. PUB. L.
97, 98 (1998).
21.

27. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). A third exception to the exclusionary
rule was recognized in the case of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,913-17 (1984) (holding where an
officer acted in good faith upon a facially valid warrant issued without probable cause, deterrence
usually does not justify applying the exclusionary rule).
28. 371 U.S. at 487-88.
29. Id. at 488 (quoting JOHN MACARTHUR MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 221 (1959)).
30. For example, in Wong Sun, the Court found that the fact that the defendant was released on
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exclusionary rule under circumstances when its deterrent purpose was
not properly served, the stage was set for yet another exception.
B.

Nix V.

WILLIAMS: ADOPTION OF THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY DOCTRINE

The Supreme Court officially adopted the "inevitable discovery"
exception to the exclusionary rule in Nix v. Williams, affirming the
conviction of an escaped mental patient who had kidnapped and
murdered a ten-year old girl roughly fifteen years earlier.3' The fifteen
years of costly litigation ensued because the primary evidence used to
convict Williams-the dead body of ten-year old Pamela Powers-was
obtained as a result of police misconduct.32 Specifically, Detective
Leaming coaxed Williams into disclosing the whereabouts of the victim's
body by appealing to his religiosity through the now infamous "Christian
Burial" speech,33 which the Court ultimately held to be a violation of
Williams's Sixth Amendment right to counsel.3'
The facts of Nix presented a particularly compelling challenge to the
exclusionary rule under which, as then-Judge Cardozo observed, "[t]he
criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered."35 Indeed, Nix
brought to bare Judge Cardozo's prophetic fear that the exclusionary
rule may someday be used to suppress evidence relating to the body of a
murdered victim because of the means by which it was found. 6 What
separated Nix from cases that actually realized Judge Cardozo's fears,
however, was that the body would have been discovered absent any
police misconduct. At the time of Detective Leaming's illicit line of
questioning, a comprehensive search party of over two hundred
his own recognizance after an illegal arrest, but later returned to the station to confess, removed any
taint from the confession. 371 U.S. at 491.
31 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
32. See id. at 436-37. The years of costly litigation, which Justice Stevens identifies in his
concurring opinion as the real cost to society of the detective's misconduct here, can be traced by the
following line of cases: State v. Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396 (Iowa 1970) (conviction in state supreme
court); Williams v. Brewer, 375 F. Supp. 170 (S.D. Iowa 1974) (first habeas proceeding); Williams v.
Brewer, 509 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1974) (affirming decision sustaining habeas petition); Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (I977) (affirming); State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 24 8 (Iowa 1979) (later
proceeding); Williams v. Nix, 528 F. Supp. 664 (S.D. Iowa 1981) (habeas proceeding); Williams v. Nix,
7o0 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir. 1983) (reversing the court below and granting habeas relief).
33. Detective Learning began a conversation with Williams, saying:
I want to give you something to think about while we're traveling down the road.... They
are predicting several inches of snow for tonight, and I feel that you yourself are the only
person that knows where this little girl's body is... and if you get a snow on top of it you
yourself may be unable to find it. And since we will be going right past the area [where the
body is] on the way into Des Moines, I feel that we could stop and locate the body, that the
parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for the little girl who was
snatched away from them on Christmas [Eve] and murdered.... [After] a snow storm [we
may not be] able to find it at all.
467 U.S.
34.
35.
36.

at 435-36 (alterations in original).
See id. at 437.
People v. Defore, i5o N.E. 585,587 (N.Y. 1926).
See id.at 588.
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community volunteers was within striking distance of the body's
location.37 Of course, once Williams had come clean as to the actual
location, the search party was called off.38 Nonetheless, the proximity of
the search party, coupled with an impending blizzard, led the trial court
to conclude that had the search party been allowed to continue, it would
have discovered the body in "essentially the same condition as it was
actually found."39

Armed with these facts, the Supreme Court was poised to endorse a
doctrine already recognized by the vast majority of courts, both state and
federal.' In admitting the evidence against Williams and officially
adopting the inevitable discovery doctrine, the Court held: "If the
prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by
lawful means-here the volunteers' search-then the deterrence
rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be received."4
So in essence, the inevitable discovery doctrine permits the
prosecution to rely on a hypothetical independent source to admit
evidence that otherwise would be suppressed under the exclusionary
rule. a"

Since its adoption in Nix, the inevitable discovery doctrine has been
the subject of a fair amount of criticism. For example, some argue that
the relatively low preponderance standard is inappropriate because the
doctrine necessarily relies on a hypothetical reconstruction of the facts.43
The Court's explicit rejection of a good faith requirement has also raised
concerns among legal commentators. 44 In addition to doctrinal criticism,
Nix left several questions open for interpretation, leading to circuit splits
in application. For instance, the so-called "primary/derivative evidence
37. Nix, 467 U.S. at 448-49.

38. Id. at 436.
39. Id. at 438.
40. Id. at 44o.
41. Id. at 444.

42. Of course, the doctrine does not open the door to an unlimited number of hypothetical
reconstructions. The Court qualified the doctrine by emphasizing that "inevitable discovery involves
no speculative elements but focuses on demonstrated historical facts capable of ready verification or
impeachment.... Id. at 444-45 n.5.
43. The dissenters in Nix were unwilling to join the majority for precisely this reason, and would
instead have required the prosecution to prove inevitable discovery by clear and convincing evidence.
See id. at 458-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting); accord Eugene L. Shapiro, Active Pursuit, Inevitable
Discovery, and the Federal Circuits: The Search for Manageable Limitations Upon an Expansive
Doctrine, 39 GONZ. L. REV. 295, 309-I I (2003).

44. See Steven P. Grossman, The Doctrine of Inevitable Discovery: A Plea for Reasonable
Limitations, 92 DIcK. L. REv. 313, 360 (1988) (arguing that the Court does serious damage to the
exclusionary rule and Fourth Amendment protections by permitting the government to use the
doctrine to overcome police illegalities committed deliberately and flagrantly); see also John E.
Fennelly, Refinement of the Inevitable Discovery Exception: The Need for a Good Faith Requirement,
17 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. Io85 (1991).
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distinction" arose because it is unclear if the Nix Court meant to restrict
the application of the exception to derivative evidence only.45
Additionally, lower courts are split on whether the existence of an active
search for the victim in Nix was a critical prerequisite (the "active
pursuit" requirement). 4" Despite the ongoing criticism and division
regarding application of the various nuances of the inevitable discovery
doctrine, the requirement that the hypothetical independent source be
lawful is one element that appeared quite straightforward. After all, the
Nix Court unequivocally mandated that the prosecution rely on "lawful
means."47 Nevertheless, a pair of recent cases has created yet another
inter-circuit conflict, and has thrust the lawful means requirement to the
forefront of the inevitable discovery debate.
C.

INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWFUL MEANS REQUIREMENT IN LIGHT OF
THE PROHIBITION AGAINST VICARIOUS EXCLUSIONARY CHALLENGES

The strand of Supreme Court jurisprudence that casts doubt on the
interpretation of the lawful means requirement of the inevitable
discovery doctrine is the prohibition on vicarious exclusionary
challenges. In Rakas v. Illinois, the defendants sought to suppress a
sawed-off rifle and shells seized by police during an illegal search of a
vehicle where the defendants were merely passengers." The Supreme
Court rejected the defendants' motion to suppress, holding, "Fourth
Amendment rights are personal rights which, 49like some other
constitutional rights, may not be vicariously asserted.
Like all exclusionary rule cases, the Court conducted a balancing test
and concluded that the cost of excluding probative evidence in such
circumstances was too great. The following passage from Alderman v.
United States captures the Court's reasoning in this line of cases:
The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those whose
rights the police have violated have been considered sufficient to
justify the suppression of probative evidence even though the case
against the defendant is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that
judgment. But we are not convinced that the additional benefits of
extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify
45. See Golden, supra note 26, at 102. According to Golden, the minority of circuit courts limits
the exception to derivative evidence only, whereas the majority view is to apply the exception to both
primary and derivative evidence. Id. at 102-o8.
46. Shapiro, supra note 43, 316-17 & nn.178-82.
Five courts of appeals have expressly rejected the view that Nix imposes an active pursuit
requirement. A sixth appears to have implicitly rejected it by its citation and apparent
approval of such opinions. Four courts of appeals have employed an active pursuit
approach. Another court has characterized the subject as "debatable," and a twelfth has not
addressed the issue.
Id. at 316-17.
47. 467 U.S. at 444.
48. 439 U.S. 128, 129-30 (1978).
49. Id. at 133-34 (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969)).
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further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those
accused of crime and having them acquitted or convicted on the basis
of all the evidence which exposes the truth."
Similarly, in United States v. Payner, the Supreme Court denied the
defendant's attempt to suppress evidence illegally obtained from a third
party.' Applying a typical exclusionary rule balancing test, the Court
concluded that "where the illegal conduct did not violate the
[defendant's]

rights,

the

interest

in

...deterring

such

conduct

is

presenting probative evidence to
outweighed by the
52 societal interest in
the trier of fact.
The prohibition against vicarious exclusionary challenges clashes
with the deterrence policy that lays at the foundation of the inevitable
discovery exception to the exclusionary rule.53 Each is firmly rooted in
Supreme Court precedent, yet their overlap creates two possible
interpretations of the lawful means requirement, which is the essence of
the circuit split.
i.
"Lawful to the Relevant Defendant Before the Court." United
States v. Scott
The First Circuit case of United States v. Scott involved an appeal
from defendant Alan Scott's conviction for an extensive array of whitecollar identity theft crimes. 4 Although there were several disputed issues
in Scott,55 the portion of the case implicating the inevitable discovery
doctrine stemmed from an alleged illegal police search. 6 A summary of
the facts is helpful to understand the ultimate holding.
On December 5, 1995, Scott drove Brian Stephens to a Circuit City
store in Natick, Massachusetts. 7 There, Stephens attempted to purchase
a camcorder by check and presented identification bearing a false name,
address and date of birth. After the check returned an unfavorable
result from the cashier, Stephens exited without reclaiming his
identification. 9 His suspicions aroused, the store manager called the
Natick Police, and Officer Daniel Brogan arrived on the scene."
Stephens returned shortly thereafter, and upon seeing Officer Brogan,
fled towards Scott's car, which was parked nearby.' Officer Brogan
50. 394 U.S. at 174-75.
447 U.S. 727, 728-31 (1980).
52. Id. at 736 n.8.
51.

53. Recent Case, United States v. Johnson, i18 HARV. L. REV. 794, 794 (2004).
54. 270 F.3d 30,33 (ist Cir. 2001).
55. See id. at 33-34.

56. See id. at 42.
57. Id. at 38.
58. Id.

59. Id.
6o. Id.
6i. Id.
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apprehended Stephens and placed him in his police cruiser, and then
approached the car where Scott was waiting." After briefly questioning
Scott, Officer Brogan removed him from the vehicle and conducted a
pat-down search that yielded no contraband.6" Nevertheless, the search
continued, and Officer Brogan discovered a hypodermic needle in the
glove compartment of the car.6' He arrested Scott for possession of this
item.6' With Scott secure, Officer Brogan returned to his police cruiser
and began to question Stephens. 66 When asked his age and place of
residence, Stephens gave answers different from those listed on the false
identification card, and Officer Brogan arrested him for attempting to
pass a bad check and conspiring with Scott to do S0.67 Ultimately, Scott's
car was searched incident to his arrest, and that search revealed some of
the materials that he sought to have suppressed at trial. 8
The First Circuit (affirming the district court) concluded that while
Officer Brogan could point to specific and articulable facts to support the
initial Terry stop, he lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion for the
subsequent frisk and sweep of Scott's person and the search of the glove
compartment in his car.69 Thus, the discovery of the hypodermic needle
was the product of an illegal search.7' Accordingly, the evidence found
during the inventory search incident to that arrest would normally be
excluded as "fruit of the poisonous tree."'" Nonetheless, that did not end
the inquiry, as the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule
remained in the prosecution's arsenal.72
The inevitable discovery doctrine was an issue in this case because
the First Circuit concluded that the questioning of Stephens would have
led inevitably to Scott's arrest, even had the illegal search of Scott's car
never occurred.73 Yet, the wrinkle that sets this case apart from its
inevitable discovery predecessors is the independent means relied upon
by the prosecution in its hypothetical reconstruction. This is because the
First Circuit concluded that the police illegally arrested Stephens without
62. Id.

63. Id.
64. Id. at 39.
65. Id. Possession of a hypodermic needle without a prescription or other justification violated
state law. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 94C, § 27(a) (2ooo).
66. Scott, 27o F.3d at 39.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 41-42.
70. Id. at 42.
7. See id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 42-43. In reaching this conclusion, the First Circuit affirmed the district court in regards
to its hypothetical reconstruction of the procession of events that would have occurred had Officer
Brogan never searched Scott, and had instead merely relied on his questioning of Stephens. See id. at
42. For purposes of this Note, the propriety of this reasoning is not an issue.
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probable cause, and Officer Brogan then illegally questioned him
without the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona.74 Thus, the
inevitable discovery of the evidence stemmed from an "illegal" arrest
and an "illegal" line of questioning.
The First Circuit acknowledged that the Supreme Court had
invariably stated in Nix that the doctrine of inevitable discovery required
"lawful" means.7" Nonetheless, the First Circuit also correctly noted,
"[n]one of those cases involved a third party and a defendant's claim that
the inevitable discovery doctrine should not apply because the third
party's rights had been violated." 6 Scott presented such a claim, and the
First Circuit was forced to interpret the lawful means requirement as
applied to a unique set of facts. Specifically, the First Circuit faced the
novel issue of "whether the government in showing inevitable discovery
may rely on an illegal action that did not violate the relevant defendant's
personal rights."77
The First Circuit answered the above question in the affirmative,
and employed two steps in its analysis. First, the court reasoned that
when a third party is involved, the lawful means requirement is a
relevant, as opposed to dispositive, factor in the inquiry."' In reaching this
conclusion, the First Circuit focused on the close link between the
inevitable discovery doctrine and the independent source doctrine,
where the question is primarily one of causation.79 According to the First
Circuit's interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, under the
independent source doctrine, suppression requires at least a finding that
the challenged evidence would not have been obtained but for a
constitutional violation to the defendant in the case at issue.,° The Court
reasoned that the principle should be the same for inevitable discovery,
concluding, "a means by which challenged evidence would inevitably
have been discovered that itself violates the law is not, by that violation
alone, unlawful as to a defendant if those means did not violate the
defendant's personal rights." 8' Thus, the First Circuit seized on the
personal nature of the exclusionary rule and applied the same principles
to the inevitable discovery doctrine. s
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
8o.

Id. at 43; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966).
Scott, 27o F.3d at 43.
Id.
Id. at 44.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 44-45 (citing Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 814 (1984)).

81. ld. at 45.
82. Id. at 44.
Ordinarily, that Stephens did not receive Miranda warnings would not benefit Scott in his
attempts to exclude evidence. Any illegality did not violate Scott's personal rights, and
courts have restricted the exclusionary rule both in the context of searches and in the
context of Miranda to violations of a defendant's personal rights.
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The second step in the First Circuit's analysis was to ensure that its
application of the inevitable discovery exception would not create an
incentive for police misconduct. The court analyzed Officer Brogan's
subjective motivations, and concluded that he had little incentive to
violate Stephens's Miranda rights in order to utilize the inevitable
discovery doctrine against Scott.". As additional factors, the First Circuit
emphasized that neither constitutional violation was particularly
egregious, and it was not clear whether Officer Brogan knew he was
violating Stephens's Miranda rights in the first place. " In the end, the
First Circuit held that application of the inevitable discovery doctrine in
Scott would not act as an incentive to unconstitutional behavior, but
suggested that "other8 5'cases may present different incentives and warrant
a different outcome.
2.
"Lawful to the World:" United States v. Johnson
The Seventh Circuit rejected the logic of the First Circuit under an
analogous set of circumstances in United States v. Johnson.s6 The ultimate
criminal charges in Johnson pertained to the counterfeiting of U.S.
currency, but those illegal activities and materials would not have come
to light but for the initial discovery of a few packets of marijuana in a
parked vehicle. 7 During the "wee hours" of a weekday morning in
Markham, Illinois in August 2002, two police officers approached the
vehicle where defendant Antoine Johnson sat in the driver's seat with
two other passengers. The officers ordered the three occupants to get
out of the car. s9 While one of the officers searched under Johnson's seat
and found drugs there, the other officer searched the passengers and
found drugs and counterfeit money on their persons.' The officers then
searched the trunk and found more evidence used against Johnson at
trial, including additional counterfeit money and a color copier.9' At trial,
Johnson sought to suppress that evidence as the "direct and indirect
products of an unlawful search."92
Similar to the circumstances of Scott, the court in Johnson concluded
that the evidence was actually discovered by virtue of police

Id. (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140-50 (1978)).
83. Id. at 45.
84- Id.
85. Id.
86. See 380 F.3d 1013, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 2004).
87. United States v. Johnson, 257 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1143 (N.D. Ill. 2003), rev'd, 380 F.3 d 1013 (7th
Cir. 2004)).

88. Id. at 1142-43.
89. Johnson, 380 F.3d at 1014.
9o . Id. at 1014-15.
I
9 . Id. at 1O15.
92. Johnson, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 1142.
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misconduct.93 Thus, Johnson argued that the search underneath his seat
was illegal, and the incriminating evidence in the trunk should be
suppressed as fruits of the poisonous tree.9" Nonetheless, the district
court concluded that the evidence would have been inevitably discovered
absent the illegal search of Johnson.95 Specifically, the contraband found
on the passengers would have given the officers probable cause to search
the rest of the vehicle, and had they done so they would have found
Johnson's incriminating possessions in the trunk. 6 The Seventh Circuit
also affirmed the district court in its finding that the officer's search of
the passengers was illegal.' Therefore, the court faced a scenario similar
to that confronted by the First Circuit in Scott, and was forced to
interpret the lawful means requirement. The Johnson court phrased the
issue as follows: "The question in this case is whether it matters if the
evidence seized illegally from the defendant had an alternative source in
another illegal search
but one that the defendant could not have
9
challenged directly."
Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Posner held that it did in fact
matter that the alternative source was an illegal search, and held the
inevitable discovery doctrine inapplicable. 99 Unlike the First Circuit, the
Seventh Circuit was unwilling to dispense with the lawful means
requirement when a third party is involved, holding it to be "part of the
essential logic of the rule."'" The crux of Judge Posner's opinion was that
two wrongs should not make a right. He reasoned:
The government's position is that because there were two illegal
searches in this case no one can invoke the exclusionary rule against
the use of the evidence obtained by the searches. In other words, the

93. The district court concluded that at most, the facts supported an initially valid approach to the
car in Terr terms, but not the requisite reasonable suspicion for a search of the car. Id. at 1146. On
appeal, the Seventh Circuit asserted that the officers did not have grounds for arrest or even a Terry
stop. Johnson, 380 F.3d at 1014. Regardless, the bottom line in both decisions was that the evidence
was actually obtained by virtue of police misconduct, and thus would normally be suppressed under
the exclusionary rule.
94. Johnson,380 F.3d at 1015.
95. Johnson, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 1147.
96. Johnson, 380 F.3d at tOt 5 . It

should be

noted

here that because of the

virtual

simultaneousness of the searches of Johnson and the passengers, the Seventh Circuit prefaced its
opinion by saying that it was not sure which doctrine-inevitable discovery or independent sourceruled this case. Id. at 1014. Yet this merely illustrates that the doctrines are very similar, and because
the First Circuit also recognized this link, the Seventh Circuit's confusion does not materially affect the
analysis. In both cases, and for the purposes of this Note in general, the inevitability of the discovery is
not a disputed issue.
97. Id. at 1015.
98. Id. at 1014.
99. Id. at 1017-18. Judges Williams and Wood joined in the opinion. Id. at 1041. Recognizing that

Johnson created a circuit split, Judge Posner circulated the decision to the full court in advance of
publication, and no judge voted to hear the case en banc. Id. at ioi8.
Ion. Id.
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more illegal searches there are, the narrower is the scope of the
application of the exclusionary rule. We cannot see what sense that
makes.''
As further support for his "two wrongs do not make a right"
principle, Judge Posner analogized the situation to the principle of
concurrent causation in tort law."2 Under that doctrine, a tortfeasor may
not escape liability by pointing to an alternative unlawful cause of the
damage inflicted "for the practical reason that tortious activity that
produces harm would go unsanctioned otherwise."'" Applying such an
analysis to the case at hand, Judge Posner concluded that the Markham
Police could not invoke an exception to the exclusionary rule (and thus
escape liability) by pointing to another unlawful search.' 4 In reaching
this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged the Supreme Court's
prohibition against vicarious Fourth Amendment challenges, but
dismissed it as inapplicable to the circumstances at hand."° Judge Posner
held the facts of Johnson to be fundamentally distinguishable from cases
such as Rakas, because here the defendant was trying to suppress
evidence obtained during a violation of his personal constitutional
rights. I°6 After all, the only reason that the defendant was forced to
challenge the search of the passengers was by virtue of the prosecution's
attempt to invoke the inevitable discovery doctrine.
The Seventh Circuit also diverged from the First Circuit in its
assessment of the incentives that its rule would present to future law
enforcement officials. If the Seventh Circuit were to allow the
prosecution to rely on the illegal search of the passengers, then
in any case in which the police have a strong hunch (though not
enough to enable them to obtain a warrant or to search without a
warrant) that all the members of a linked group have some contraband,
the police could, if the government is right, search all the members of
the group without fear that any contraband found on them could not
be used in evidence.' 7
Thus, according to Judge Posner, the interpretation of the lawful
means requirement adopted by the First Circuit would create a positive
incentive for future police misconduct, running afoul of the deterrent
purpose behind the exclusionary rule. °8

io1. Id. at 1017.
102.

Id. at ioi6.

103. Id.

io4. Id.
105. "The search of the passengers was illegal, but normally A cannot challenge the legality of the
search of B even when the search produces information used to convict A." Id. at 1o1 5 (citing Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 132-33 (1978)).
io6. Id.
107. Id. at Ioi5-i6.
io8. Id.

November 2006]

LAWFUL TO THE WORLD

The Johnson and Scott cases represent an important circuit split in
the interpretation of the lawful means requirement of the inevitable
discovery doctrine when multiple parties are involved. While the
Supreme Court's Nix decision unequivocally calls for lawful means,
therefore supporting the Seventh Circuit's interpretation, the Court's
prohibition on vicarious exclusionary challenges lends support to the
First Circuit's conclusion. The question remains as to which
interpretation is the better one and why.
II.

A.

ANALYSIS

31
In order to determine the correct interpretation of the lawful means
requirement, it is helpful to frame the analysis around one concrete set of
facts. The hypothetical factual scenario that follows will be the basis for
the further analysis of this Note, and will be hereinafter referred to as
"The events of October 3 1."'09
On October 31, two police officers approach Alan's vehicle stopped
in a parking lot, in which Alan sits in the driver's seat, and Barry sits in
the front passenger seat. The officers suspect that the car contains
contraband, yet they lack both the reasonable suspicion to support a frisk
and sweep of Alan and Barry, as well as probable cause to arrest the
men. Nonetheless, the officers proceed with the investigation. Officer X
reaches the driver's side window and orders Alan out of the car. Officer
X then illegally searches Alan and finds no contraband on his person.
Officer X proceeds to illegally search the trunk of Alan's car, where he
finds contraband, including a large amount of counterfeit currency and
false credit cards. While Officer X is conducting this illegal line of
searches, Officer Y has ordered Barry out of the car, illegally searched
his person, and discovered a bag of marijuana. Shortly thereafter, both
men are arrested. The following diagram depicts the series of events,
with Officer X's investigation labeled "Series i," and Officer Y's search
of Barry labeled "Series 2":
HYPOTHETICAL: THE EVENTS OF OCTOBER

to9. This hypothetical is basically a synthesis of the facts of Scott and Johnson. Although it is
distinguishable in certain respects from the facts of Scott, because there the violation of the
accomplice's rights was an illegal line of questioning, the disparity is not of such weight that it has a
material effect on the analysis. For the purposes of this Note, assume that the First Circuit would
follow the same line of reasoning and reach the same conclusion as it did in Scott if it were confronted
with the facts in this hypothetical.
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FIGURE I: EVENTS OF OCTOBER 31
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In Alan's subsequent trial proceeding, he is charged with various
counterfeiting offenses, and the prosecution attempts to introduce the
incriminating evidence found in the trunk of his car. Alan moves to
suppress the evidence on the basis that it was obtained as a result of
Officer X's illegal search of his person, and therefore should be excluded
as fruit of the poisonous tree. The prosecution grants this primary
illegality, but nonetheless asserts that the evidence would have inevitably
been discovered absent the illegal search of Alan. Specifically, the
prosecution argues that the marijuana found on Barry's person gave
Officer Y probable cause to search the trunk, and thus the evidence
would have been discovered even if Officer X had never illegally
searched Alan. The dashed line from Barry to the trunk represents the
hypothetical independent source of discovery of the evidence."'
Of course, the decision of whether or not to admit the evidence
against Alan will turn on whether the court adopts the First or Seventh
Circuit's interpretation of the word "lawful." Applying the First Circuit's
interpretation, the illegal search of Barry was lawful in relation to Alan,
and the prosecution can rely on it to invoke the inevitable discovery
doctrine. Under the Seventh Circuit's interpretation, however, the
prosecution may not rely on the illegal search of Barry because it was not
lawful in the abstract. Accordingly, the exception to the exclusionary rule
does not apply, and the evidence should be suppressed as fruits of the
poisonous tree.
Series 2 contains the key sequence of events. In the inevitable
discovery context, the court grants the primary illegality, so Series i is
temporarily set aside. Then, if the line from Barry to the trunk were solid
instead of dashed, meaning that the evidence had actually been obtained
as a result of Officer Y's illegal search of Barry, the Court's prohibition
tIn. The line is dashed because Officer Y never actually searched the trunk following his illegal
search of Barry. The evidence was actually discovered by Officer X during his illegal search of the
trunk. Thus, Series I represents reality, and Series 2 is the prosecution's hypothetical reconstruction of
the facts used to invoke the inevitable discovery doctrine.
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on vicarious exclusionary challenges dictates that the evidence must be
admitted. Yet the line is dashed, and Series 2 only comes into play as a
hypothetical independent source for discovery of the evidence in the
trunk. To accept the Seventh Circuit's reasoning would be advocating the
proposition that the outcome should be different when Series 2 is a
hypothetical as opposed to reality. As further analysis in this Note
reveals, this is indeed the correct conclusion.
B.

THE CORRECT INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWFUL MEANS REQUIREMENT

The Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the lawful means
requirement of the inevitable discovery doctrine is the correct one. Not
only does interpreting "lawful" to mean "lawful to the world" afford
proper credence to the doctrine as laid out by the Supreme Court in Nix,
but it also rings true in light of several policy considerations and is the
more desirable result from a justice standpoint.
In Nix, the Supreme Court adopted the inevitable discovery doctrine
to properly balance the scales of justice. All exclusionary rule cases
involve a necessary balancing test, where the court balances the interest
of society in deterring police misconduct, on the one hand, and the public
interest in having juries receive all probative evidence of a crime, on the
other."' To lay the foundation for its acceptance of the inevitable
discovery doctrine, the Supreme Court emphasized that the balance is
properly struck "by putting the police in the same, not a worse, position
that they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had
occurred .....
In the typical inevitable discovery case, where the evidence
would have been discovered by lawful means, admitting the evidence
puts the police in the same position that they would have been in absent
any misconduct.
Here, however, where the prosecution relies on unlawful means,
admission of the evidence would put the police in a better position than
it would have been in absent any misconduct, allowing them to profit
from their illicit behavior. Absent any police misconduct, the marijuana
would not have been found on the person of Barry. Thus, the chain of
inevitability would break without the illegal search. Accordingly,
exclusion of the evidence in the hypothetical puts the police in the same,
not a worse, position than they would have been in absent any police
misconduct. This is the proper societal balance that the Supreme Court
called for in Nix.
In addition, Judge Posner's rejection of the "two wrongs make a
right" principle is very attractive from a common sense standpoint.
Officer X illegally searched Alan, and therefore the evidence discovered
iii.

See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431. 443 (0984).

I12. Id.
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in the trunk would normally be suppressed as fruits of the poisonous
tree. The prosecution's argument is that because Officer Y illegally
searched Barry, the evidence should be admitted. In other words, the
more illegal searches there are, the narrower the application of the
exclusionary rule. In Johnson, the Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected such
a bizarre conclusion. There, Judge Posner stressed that there is a need
for punishment when the government has only relied on a series of illegal
acts." 3 This common sense appeal led the Supreme Court of Kansas to
endorse the Seventh Circuit's decision in the only subsequent case to
confront a similar set of facts."4
Furthermore, the most compelling argument in favor of the Seventh
Circuit's interpretation of the lawful means requirement is that the
opposite conclusion would create an incentive for future violations of
constitutional rights. If police officers such as Officer X and Officer Y are
allowed to escape liability for their illicit behavior, then there will be
nothing to deter them from engaging in such illegal searches in the
future. Applying the inevitable discovery doctrine here would allow all of
the evidence to be admitted against Alan in his trial. In addition, the
evidence found on Barry would be admissible against him in his
subsequent trial, because the prosecution can argue that because Officer
X found incriminating evidence in the trunk, that would have given him
probable cause to search the other passengers in the vehicle.
Furthermore, if any of the contraband discovered by Officer X in the
trunk also served to incriminate Barry, it would be admissible through
the inevitable discovery doctrine. This type of criss-crossing strategy
would become prudent prosecutorial practice, and would create a virtual
manual for police officers to compile as many constitutional violations as
possible, knowing that all of the evidence could potentially be admitted
by virtue of the inevitable discovery doctrine."' This kind of behavior
must be deterred, and eliminating the threat of exclusion would give
officers who approach a vehicle with multiple passengers an incentive to
disregard the constitutional rights of those individuals. The inevitable
discovery doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule, not a
loophole.
I13.

Johnson,3 80 F.3d at io16.

114. State v. Ackward, 128 P.3D 382, 397 (Kan. 2006). In Ackward, a gun was seized in violation of

the defendant's right to counsel. Id. at 396. The prosecution argued that the evidence would have been
discovered as a result of an illegal search of somebody else's house, to which the defendant could not
object. Id. The court rejected the inevitable discovery claim, citing the Seventh Circuit's reasoning:
"[T]he Johnson court could see no sense in the government's position and held that the inevitable
discovery of evidence by unlawful means did not render it admissible. We agree." Id. at 397.
115. It can be argued that significant disincentives exist, such as departmental discipline and civil
liability, as the Supreme Court noted in Nix itself. 467 U.S. at 446. Yet as Judge Posner emphasized in
Johnson, "if damages were considered a completely adequate deterrent to violations of the Fourth
Amendment, the exclusionary rule would have been abandoned long ago." 38o F. 3 d at ioi6.
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While the conclusion that Judge Posner reaches must be the correct
one from the standpoint of justice, his opinion nonetheless does not
adequately address the conflict with the Supreme Court's prohibition
against vicarious Fourth Amendment challenges. Judge Posner deals
with this conflict by characterizing the prohibition against vicarious
challenges as a standing principle. " 6 He then dismisses that standing issue
as not applicable:
This would be correct if Johnson were trying to prevent the contraband
seized from the passengers, as distinct from the trunk of the car, from
being used against him.... But all he is trying to do is prevent the use
of evidence seized from him-from the trunk of his car. And so the
question is not his standing to challenge the use against him of
evidence seized illegally from other people.... "'

Judge Posner is correct that Johnson's rights were violated, but that
cannot dispose of the issue completely because the Supreme Court has
previously rejected analysis similar to Judge Posner's standing analysis.
In Rakas, the Supreme Court emphasized, "[t]his Court's long history of
insistence that Fourth Amendment rights are personal in nature has
already answered many of the traditional standing inquiries, and we
think that definition of those rights is more properly placed within the
purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of
standing."'" 8 Thus, it can be argued that the Court's prohibition of
vicarious Fourth Amendment challenges carries beyond the threshold
standing inquiry and applies throughout the analysis. Accordingly, Rakas
prohibits Alan from making the argument that the evidence should be
excluded because the search of Barry was illegal. At the very least, Rakas
suggests that because Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights, then
the lawful means requirement of the inevitable discovery doctrine is also
personal in nature.
This apparently irreconcilable conflict is why Judge Posner's analogy
to tort law is so attractive. The tort analogy is a clever way to bridge the
apparent gap, and reaches the correct result from a justice standpoint
while rooting it in well-established legal principles. To be sure, there are
other options that the Supreme Court could pursue in order to reconcile
the conflict. For example, the Court could change either the rule's
application by abandoning the prohibition on third party exclusionary
challenges, or the rule's justification by allowing that there are values
other than deterrence that justify the rule and guide its application.' 9
There is also the more radical possibility of abandoning the exclusionary

1i6. Johnson, 380 F.3d at 1015.

II7. Id.
ii8. 439 U.S. 128, 140 (978).
ii9. Recent Case, supra note 53, at 8oi n.48.
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rule altogether.' ° But as it stands, the conflict exists, and the tort analogy
is a nice way to resolve the inconsistencies in circuit court application and
adopt the most just interpretation of the lawful means requirement.
However, while Judge Posner's chosen tort analogy reaches the correct
conclusion from a justice standpoint, it is misguided.
C.

CRITICISM OF THE SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR ANALOGY

In Johnson, Judge Posner analogizes the facts to the substantial
factor test in tort law to support his conclusion that the lawful means
requirement should be interpreted as lawful to the world.'"' A brief
explanation of the substantial factor test is instructive.
In the negligence realm of tort law, the plaintiff must usually "prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that but for the defendant's conduct,
the plaintiff would not have been harmed .....
Nonetheless, the
substantial factor test is used instead of the "but for" test in cases of
simultaneous redundant causes, as illustrated in the case of Anderson v.
Minneapolis, Saint Paul and Sault Ste. Marie Railway Co.'"3 As Anderson
suggests, if defendant A is careless with fire on one side of a plaintiff's
house, and defendant B is careless with fire on the other side of the
house, and both fires merge to destroy it, then each defendant may be
considered a substantial factor and be held liable.' 4 While the conduct of
neither A nor B may be considered a "but for" cause of the damage, it
would seem unfair to exonerate both defendants in such a case.2 5 Thus,
under the substantial factor test, multiple tortfeasors who concurrently
cause an indivisible injury are jointly and severally
liable, meaning that
6
each can be held liable for the entire injury. u
The substantial factor test is an attractive analogy for inevitable
discovery cases such as Scott and Johnson that leads to the correct
ultimate conclusion. Nevertheless, there are several flaws in the
comparison. To illustrate the subtle inconsistencies, consider the events
of October 31 using Judge Posner's approach. The ultimate question is
whether or not the police officers will be "liable" for their misconduct in
the form of suppression of the incriminating evidence in Alan's
subsequent trial.
The first step in the inevitable discovery analysis illustrates a
i2o. Some critics have argued if favor of this radical possibility. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth
Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 785-800 (1994).
121. 380 F.3 d at ioi6. The "substantial factor" test is the same as the concurrent causation test. In

Johnson, Judge Posner uses the term "concurrent causation," but for the purposes of this Note, it is
interchangeable with the substantial factor test.
122. JOHN L. DIAMOND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 198 (2001).
123.
124.
125.
126.

179 N.W. 45. 49 (Minn. 1920).
Id.; accord DIAMOND, supra note 122, at 204.
DIAMOND, supra note 122, at204.
See Northington v. Marin, 102 F.3d 1564, 1569 (ioth Cir. 1996).
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discrepancy in the comparison to the substantial factor test. When the
prosecution attempts to invoke the inevitable discovery doctrine to admit
the evidence against Alan, the court sets aside Series i, and it is as if the
illegal search of Alan had never taken place.'27 And because Alan cannot
challenge the illegal search of Barry, the evidence is admissible, and the
police are not "liable." However, Judge Posner's interpretation of the
lawful means requirement rejects this conclusion. When you bring Series
i back into the equation, and Series 2 becomes a hypothetical
reconstruction of the facts, then the evidence should be suppressed
because the prosecution has not relied on truly lawful means. Thus, when
there is one violation (Series 2), the evidence is admissible against Alan,
but when there are two violations, the evidence is inadmissible. The
outcome therefore switches from the first step (no liability), to the
ultimate conclusion in favor of suppression of the evidence.
Turning to the substantial factor analogy, the end result is the same,
but the first step is distinguishable. Consider facts similar to the
Anderson case, where two fires, Fire A and Fire B, are simultaneous
redundant causes of the destruction of the plaintiff's house. Fire A can be
analogized to Series i in the inevitable discovery hypothetical, and Fire B
to Series 2. And like that example, let us imagine that Fire A never
happened. If that were the case, then Fire B would still have burned
down the plaintiff's house, and there would still be liability. Bringing Fire
A back into the equation, the substantial factor test dictates that both
defendants A and B are jointly and severally liable. Thus, when there is
one negligent actor (step one), there is liability, and when there are two
negligent actors (step two), there is also liability.
The different starting points illustrate a subtle flaw in Judge Posner's
chosen analogy. The first step in the inevitable discovery analysis is that
there is no liability if you take away Series i (because of the Court's
prohibition against vicarious exclusionary challenges). On the other
hand, in the substantial factor analysis, if you take away Fire A there is
still liability and the plaintiff will be able to recover from defendant who
started Fire B. Thus, although the ultimate result is the same under both,
the first step in the analysis is distinguishable.
Furthermore, in concluding his tort analogy, Judge Posner states,
"[t]he tortfeasor cannot avoid liability by pointing to an alternative
unlawful cause of the damage that he inflicted..... This is true, yet under

the substantial factor test, the tortfeasor also cannot avoid liability by
pointing to an alternative lawful cause of the damage. To be sure, some
commentators have proposed that courts not utilize the substantial factor

127. See supra Part II.A.

128. United States v. Johnson, 380 F.3d 1013, io6 (7th Cir. 2004).
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test when one or more of the causes is non-negligent.'29 The Restatement
(Second) of Torts rejects this approach and applies the substantial factor
test for simultaneous causes even if one or more of the causes is
natural. 30 On the other hand, the prosecution can certainly avoid liability
in the inevitable discovery context by pointing to an alternative lawful
cause of the damage. For example, if Officer Y's search of Barry was
legal, then there is little doubt that the evidence should be admissible.
This distinction is another factor that weighs against Judge Posner's
analogy to the substantial factor test.
Finally, Judge Posner identifies a possible flaw in his reasoning, yet
dismisses it rather tersely: "The concurrent-causation case may seem to
differ from our case insofar as both fire makers violated the plaintiff's
rights, whereas here the tortious search of Johnson's passengers did not
violate Johnson's rights. But actually the issue is the same."' '3' Query
whether this difference is as negligible as Judge Posner asserts it to be.
For instance, imagine a substantial factor scenario where Fire A destroys
the house of the plaintiff's neighbor, which is analogous to Officer Y
illegally searching Barry, the passenger. Further, let us say that Fire A
was so powerful, that after burning the neighbor's house, it would have
spread and burned down the plaintiff's house an hour later. At that
moment, Fire B sweeps in and destroys the plaintiff's house (which
would have been destroyed an hour later anyway). Under these
circumstances, some courts would apply the incremental loss component
of the traditional "but for" test, and Defendant B would only be liable
for the short one-hour "life expectancy" of the plaintiff's house.'32 Yet if
Fire B had burned the plaintiff's house at the same time as Fire A, then
Defendant B would be liable for the entire value. "In essence, the
substantial factor test produces a different result from the 'but for' test in
cases of 33simultaneous causes, but not in cases of nearly simultaneous
causes."
Applying this principle to the events of October 31, the critical
simultaneousness of the substantial factor test calls Judge Posner's
analogy into question. Series 2 is analogous to Fire A in the above
example. Fire A destroys the house of the plaintiff's neighbor, and is of
such force that it would burn the plaintiff's house shortly thereafter.
Likewise, Officer Y's illegal search of Barry uncovered marijuana that
would have led him to ultimately search the trunk. Yet, before that could
129.

See, e.g., Robert J. Peaslee, Multiple Causation and Damages, 47 HARv. L.

REV. 1127, 1131

(934).
130. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) cmt. d (1988).
131. Johnson, 380 F.3d at ioi6.
132. See Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., 163 A. iii, 1t4-15 (N.H. 1932); see also DIAMOND,
supra note 122, at 205.
133. DIAMOND,

supra note

122,

at

205.
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happen, Officer X illegally searched Alan, and then swept in and
searched the trunk himself. This is similar to Fire B, which swept in and
burned the plaintiff's house before Fire A reached it. Applying the
incremental loss component of the tort analogy, Officer X is not
necessarily liable for the evidence obtained in the trunk. The critical
simultaneousness of the substantial factor test suggests that under certain
circumstances the analogy supports the First Circuit's interpretation,
where the police will escape liability as long as they did not have the
incentive to violate the search victim's rights. As the First Circuit
emphasized, different cases may present different incentives and warrant
different outcomes. Regardless, it is not at all clear that the issues are in
fact the same, as Judge Posner claims.
Admittedly, the substantial factor analogy is appealing, and the
inconsistencies are not so strong as to entirely undermine Judge Posner's
overall analysis. Nonetheless, the inconsistencies do suggest that the
analogy is not the best one available. Instead of the substantial factor
test, the conception of "duty" in negligence law provides a better analogy
to support the conclusion that the lawful means requirement of the
inevitable discovery doctrine should be interpreted as lawful to the
world.

D.

THE PALSGRAF DEBATE PROVIDES THE BEST ANALOGY

The tort concept of "duty" in negligence actions presents the best
analogy to help reconcile the conflict between the prohibition on
vicarious exclusionary challenges and the lawful means requirement of
the inevitable discovery doctrine. In the tort realm of negligence, the
duty element limits a defendant's responsibility for unreasonable conduct
that caused the plaintiff injury.'34 In particular, duty focuses on to whom
the defendant owes an obligation to conform to an established standard
of conduct.'35 There are two conceptions of the duty requirement,
illustrated by the majority and dissenting opinions in Palsgraf v. Long
Island Railroad Co.,' which supply the framework for the analogy here.
Palsgraf is probably the most famous case in all of tort law, and
certainly one of the most controversial.'37 The plaintiff (Mrs. Palsgraf)
was standing on a platform of the defendant's railroad when a train
arrived at the station." 8 Two men hurried forward to catch the train as it
was departing, and one of the men was carrying a small package covered
in newspaper. ' The man with the package jumped aboard the car, but
134. Id. at 244.
135. Id.

136. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
137. William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MicH. L. REv. I, 1(953).
138. Palsgraf,162 N.E. at 99.
139. Id.
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then wavered, and a guard pushed him from behind to help him inside. 40
The push dislodged the package (which turned out to contain fireworks),
the package exploded when it hit the ground, and the shock from the
explosion knocked down some scales many feet away.'4 ' The scales struck
Mrs. Palsgraf, causing her injuries.'42 Mrs. Palsgraf sued for damages from
those injuries, and her recovery ultimately hinged on whether the guard,
who could not have known that the package contained explosives, owed
a duty to Mrs. Palsgraf, who stood many feet away at the other end of the
platform when the explosion occurred.'43
Writing for the majority, Judge Cardozo concluded that there was no
liability because there was no negligence toward the plaintiff." 4 Judge
Cardozo interpreted the element of duty as a relational concept whereby
a defendant owes a duty to refrain from negligent conduct only to victims
in the foreseeable zone of danger.'45 "Proof of negligence in the air, so to
speak, will not do.', 46 Judge Cardozo further reasoned: "The plaintiff
sues in her own right for a wrong personal to her, and not as the vicarious
beneficiary of a breach of duty to another."' 47 The conduct of the guard
toward the man with the package involved no foreseeable risk that the
plaintiff might be injured.' 4 It was therefore not a tort as to her, and as a
matter of law she could not recover.'49 In essence, even though the guard
may have breached the requisite standard of conduct and caused the
plaintiff's injuries, the railroad was able to avoid liability because of the
limitation drawn around the zone of foreseeability.' ° Judge Cardozo's
opinion represents the current majority view and is endorsed by the
Restatement (Second) of Torts.'5'
In dissent, Judge Andrews rejected the majority's proposition that a
duty is owed only to foreseeable victims.' s Judge Andrews discarded the
relational concept of duty as too narrow, and held that negligence is a
wrong toward anyone in fact injured by the negligent act.'53 Instead of
owing a duty only to those victims in the foreseeable zone of danger,
"[e]very one owes to the world at large the duty of refraining from those
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144. Prosser, supra note 137, at 5.
145. DIAMOND, supra note 122, at 244.
146. Palsgraf,162 N.E. at 99 (quoting Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 815, 816 (N.Y. 1920)).
147. Id. at ioo.
148. Prosser, supra note 137, at 5.
149. Id.
I5o. DIAMOND, supra note 122, at 245.
15i.Id. at 244.
152. Palsgraf,162 N.E. at 102-103 (Andrews, J., dissenting).
153. Id.; accord Prosser, supra note 137, at 6.
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acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of others.' 54
Furthermore, because the explosion caused the scales to fall, which in
turn caused the plaintiff's injuries, she was not suing as the vicarious
beneficiary of a breach to another. To the contrary, "[h]er action is
original and primary. Her claim is for a breach of duty to herself. ...""'
While Judge Andrews's opinion is in dissent, it nevertheless represents a
viable minority view followed by courts today.' 56
The juxtaposition of the Palsgraf opinions offers an instructive
analogy to reconcile the apparent conflict between the Supreme Court's
prohibition against vicarious exclusionary challenges and the inevitable
discovery doctrine. To apply the tort analogy to the criminal procedure
realm, recall the events of October 31, and imagine that Alan is once
again before the court and has filed a motion to suppress the
incriminating evidence.
Setting aside an inevitable discovery claim for the time being, the
prohibition against vicarious Fourth Amendment challenges is akin to
Judge Cardozo's relational concept of duty. To see this, remove Series i
from the equation, so that the incriminating evidence in the trunk was
actually found by virtue of the illegal search of Barry. Under these
circumstances, Alan's personal constitutional rights were not violated,
and his only avenue to suppress the evidence is to vicariously assert the
Fourth Amendment rights of Barry. Of course, the Supreme Court
prohibits such challenges, and the evidence will be admissible against
Alan despite the fact that it was obtained as a result of an illegal search
of Barry. In other words, the police officers will not be "liable" for their
misconduct. Like Judge Cardozo's limitation on duty in a negligence
action, here, the Supreme Court has injected a personal, relational
concept into its exclusionary rule jurisprudence. The Court
acknowledges that the evidence was obtained through an illegal search,
but that the officer really only had a duty to the victim of the search. The
evidence will not be admissible against Barry, but beyond that, the Court
limits the "liability" of the police officers. Analogous to Mrs. Palsgraf,
Alan is outside of the foreseeable zone of danger of the search of Barry,
and therefore is not entitled to compensation in the form of suppression
of the evidence. The Court is willing to hold the police liable with respect
to the victim of the search, but is unwilling to extend that "liability" to
third parties.
On the other hand, when Series 2 is relied upon as a hypothetical
reconstruction to invoke the inevitable discovery doctrine, the Court
should analyze it under the more exacting standard used by Judge
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Andrews, which is analogous to Judge Posner's "lawful to the world"
interpretation of the lawful means requirement. Here, Series i comes
back into play, as that is how the incriminating evidence in the trunk was
actually obtained. Nonetheless, as in any inevitable discovery claim, the
Supreme Court grants the initial illegality and puts it aside. The
prosecution then relies on Series 2 to argue that the evidence would have
been inevitably discovered absent the illegal search of Alan because of
the drugs found during the illegal search of Barry. And as we saw above,
if this were indeed how the facts had played out, Alan may not challenge
the validity of Series 2 because it did not violate his personal
constitutional rights, and the evidence is admissible. Now, the question
remains as to why the outcome should be any different if we are talking
about a hypothetical reconstruction of the facts as opposed to reality.
Judge Andrews's broad conception of duty in a negligence action
provides the answer by analogy.
In a hypothetical reconstruction in the inevitable discovery realm,
the "duty" owed by law enforcement officers should be analyzed under
the more demanding standard proposed by Judge Andrews and endorsed
by a minority of courts. Judge Andrews asserted that a negligent actor
owes a duty to the public at large, and not merely those in the
foreseeable zone of danger. The starting point of an inevitable discovery
claim distinguishes a hypothetical reconstruction of the facts from those
facts existing in the context of a traditional vicarious Fourth Amendment
challenge. The key is that in the inevitable discovery realm, the police
have already blundered, so the starting point is a violation of Alan's
personal constitutional rights. Thus, when the prosecution relies on
Series 2 to negate a violation of the defendant's personal rights, the
police officers should be held to a higher standard. Instead of only having
a duty to the victim of the search, Officer Y has a duty to the world at
large to conform to constitutional requirements. Thus, if we are going to
allow the police officers to escape liability with the inevitable discovery
exception to the exclusionary rule, they must prove that the search relied
upon in the hypothetical was lawful to the world. Therefore, the
prosecution may not rely on the search of Barry unless it was lawful in
the abstract, not just lawful in relation to Alan. Here, because Officer I's
search of Barry was illegal, it does not satisfy the lawful means
requirement analyzed under Judge Andrews's conception of duty.
Furthermore, like Mrs. Palsgraf in Judge Andrews's opinion, Alan is
vindicating a breach of his personal rights. The evidence was actually
obtained in violation his personal Fourth Amendment rights, and it is
only as a result of the prosecution's inevitable discovery argument that
he is forced to vicariously assert the rights of Barry.
Thus, the Palsgrafopinions offer an excellent analogy under which
to analyze the interpretation of the lawful means requirement when
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multiple parties are involved. In the typical case where evidence is
illegally seized from a third party not before the court, the evidence is
admissible against the relevant defendant. This is the essence of the
prohibition against vicarious exclusionary challenges, and analogous to
Judge Cardozo's conception of duty in Palsgraf. However, when the
illegal search of a third party is the basis for an inevitable discovery
claim, Judge Andrews's conception of duty should apply. The police
cannot escape liability by pointing to an alternative unlawful source, as
the officers have a duty to the public at large in the context of a
hypothetical reconstruction of the facts in the inevitable discovery realm.
Ultimately, the Palsgraf analogy pays proper credence to both the
prohibition against vicarious exclusionary challenges and the lawful
means requirement of the inevitable discovery doctrine. Analyzing the
conflict under principles of tort law is instructive, and the Palsgrafdebate
provides the most effective analogy.
CONCLUSION

The Seventh Circuit's Johnson decision has revealed yet another
inconsistent application of the elements of the inevitable discovery
doctrine. The Supreme Court needs to bring some clarity to this
amorphous doctrine, as divergent application may have significant effects
on police procedure and prosecutorial practice. A broad interpretation of
the lawful means requirement must be the correct one. Otherwise, law
enforcement officials will have a positive incentive to disregard
constitutional rights, and prosecutors will be able to implement the
inevitable discovery doctrine as a loophole through the exclusionary rule.
Nonetheless, such a broad interpretation unavoidably collides with the
Supreme Court's prohibition against vicarious exclusionary challenges.
Applying tort principles to the issue at hand is an excellent avenue
to reach the just conclusion while escaping the conflicting strings of
Supreme Court jurisprudence. Judge Posner chose the substantial factor
test, which is attractive, yet subject to criticism. The better analogy is
illustrated by the majority and minority opinions in Palsgraf, which
represent the majority and minority conceptions of duty in negligence
actions, respectively. Ultimately, Judge Andrews's "duty to the public at
large" conception should be injected into the inevitable discovery realm,
so that the lawful means requirement is interpreted as "lawful to the
world." This interpretation halts an unwarranted expansion of the
inevitable discovery doctrine, and maintains the integrity of the
exclusionary rule.
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